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Departmental Comment
Congressional Affairs
Activities of the Second Session of the 92d Congress Relating to InternationalLaw and ForeignAffairs.
Debates in the 1972 Congress on foreign policy were largely centered on
two aspects of what is basically constitutional law. The paramount issue of
the first session of the 92d Congress, the relative war powers of the
executive and legislative branches, was continued in the second session.
There also appeared deep differences between the President and the Congress on the use of executive agreements instead of treaties to formalize
international undertakings.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings in May on the
causes and origins of the war in Vietnam. If focused its attention on the
President's decision to mine the harbors and ports of North Vietnam.
Several scholars and former government officials were invited to testify.
Much of the material for discussion was provided by the Defense Department's Compilation of "United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-67" (The
Pentagon Papers), then declassified and published. Chairman Fulbright
said, "Unfortunately the high ranking officials who were invited either
refused to testify or backed out at the last moment." The Chief of the
Pentagon's task force that prepared the Papers, Leslie H. Gelb, now a
fellow at Brookings Institution, stated: "The United States is not the
keeper of Vietnamese morality and it is wrong to perpetuate this war."
James C. Thompson, Jr., of Harvard University, who was a Far-eastern
expert in the Department of State 1961- 1966, said that the decision to
mine the North Vietnamese harbors compounded the tragedy of the last 25
years. On the origins of the war, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., said, "the system
failed dismally. It failed to provide any systematic and serious assessment
of American stakes in Vietnam. It was terribly wrong in regard to Hanoi
and the Viet Cong as the spearhead of Chinese aggression ... the Vietnam
adventure was marked much more by ignorance, misjudgment, muddle and
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stupidity than ...by efficiency, foresight, awareness and calculation." Abbot Low Moffat, Chief of the State Department's Division of Southeastern
Affairs, 1945- 1947, said, "We are reaping today ...the tragedy of our
fixation on the theory of monolithic aggressive communism ......
The ninety second Congress, however, refused to challenge the President on the conduct of the war. Having left four Presidents with the
decision to begin and continue the Vietnam War, the Congress left to
President Nixon the decision of how and when to stop it. The Senate took
its toughest stand but the House, as usual, supported the administration
and refused to agree to a date for withdrawal.
War Powers
On April 13, the Senate passed S2956 defining the powers of the Congress and the President in decisions involving the Armed Forces in hostilities. This was the first time either house had undertaken to codify the war
powers which were left vague by the Constitution. It was also the first step
by the Senate in its effort to restore to Congress its share of constitutional
powers over decisions involving war or peace which many Senators believe
has been usurped by successive Presidents since World War II.
Despite opposition by President Nixon, the bill was supported by a
broad coalition of Republicans and Democrats and was passed by a vote of
68 to 16. The chief sponsors of the bill were Senators Jacob R. Javits (R.
N. Y.) and John C. Stennis, (D. Miss), the latter, the Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee.
S2956 provided:
(a) In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, Armed
Forces could be committed to hostilities or to situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, only:
(1) To repel an armed attack on the United States or to forestall the
"direct and immediate threat of such an attack."
(2) To repel an armed attack against United States Armed Forces
outside the United States or to forestall the threat of such
attacks.
(3) To protect and evacuate United States citizens and nationals in
another country if their lives were threatened.
(4) Pursuant to special statutory authorization by Congress (not to
be inferred from any existing or future law or treaty unless
special authorization were provided). Special statutory authority
would also be required for assignments of United States military
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personnel to assist a foreign nation's forces in hostilities or
situations where hostilities were imminent.
(b) That the President report promptly to the Congress the commitment
of Armed Forces for such purposes.
(c) A limit of thirty days for the involvement of United States forces
unless the Congress by special legislation authorizes their continued
use.

(d) Congress, by act or joint resolution could terminate the use of the
Armed Forces by the President before the end of the thirty day
period.
(e) Procedures to require prompt consideration in both houses of any
bill or joint resolution authorizing or terminating the use of the
Armed Forces by the President.
(f) Made the act effective upon enactment, but exempted from its provisions any hostilities in which United States forces were engaged at
that time.
The House passed an amended version of S2956, but it died in Conference at the end of the Session.
Executive Agreements
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers,
chaired by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., (D.N.C.), had hearings in April and
May on S3475 which would require congressional consideration of all
executive agreements.
In the years after World War II, executive agreements were increasingly
used where treaties had formerly served. Many were kept secret, some
even from the Congress, and several Senators regarded this as a major
aspect of Presidential usurpation of their constitutional powers. The executive branch argued that the executive agreement was a useful and necessary instrument in the conduct of diplomacy by a major power under
modern conditions of rapid communications and nuclear weapons.
As of January, 1972, the United States was a party to 947 treaties, and
over 4000 executive agreements.
S3475, introduced on April 11 by Senator Ervin, was referred to the
Judiciary Committee with the understanding that if approved, it would then
be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee which was giving major
attention to the subject.
The bill defined an executive agreement and required that each agreement be sent to both houses of Congress. If the President determined that
disclosure would threaten national security, an agreement could be sent to
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs
Committee under an injuction of secrecy. Each agreement would go into
effect 60 days after its transmittal to Congress, unless both houses adopted
a concurrent resolution of disapproval.
At hearings begun on April 24, Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, said that either house by itself should be
able to reject an executive agreement. Since the House and Senate have
differing views of international affairs, the requirement of a joint resolution
would be a prescription for a stalemate which would permit every executive agreement to receive tacit approval.
Senator Clifford P. Case (R.N.J.), who had introduced four measures
dealing with executive agreements approved by the Senate, said that executive agreements should be used only for relatively unimportant matters.
He pointed out that the Congress is asked to pay the costs of such things
as foreign bases and Korean mercenaries but is never able to exercise its
constitutional responsibility of considering them in advance.
Senator Stuart Symington (D. Mo.), Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee's Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad, testifying in support of S3475, said that his subcommittee's investigation found that the United States now maintains 375
major bases and more than 3000 minor installations around the world, a
large number of which were established under executive agreements or
understandings. Many of these were unknown to most members of Congress.
Testimony in disapproval of S3475 characterized it as unworkable, unnecessary and to the extent that it covered agreements entered into pursuant to the sole executive authority of the President, unconstitutional.
The Legal Adviser of the Department of State, John R. Stevenson,
asserted that the President's ability to resolve international differences by
firm agreements with immediate binding effect is frequently of critical
importance in obtaining and formalizing concessions from other governments. Mr. Stevenson had previously explained (October 21, 1971) the
standards which guided the State Department in choosing the type of
agreement for a given transaction.
A treaty is used:
1. Where the subject matter and treatment thereof is traditionally
handled by treaty.
2. Where the subject matter and treatment thereof is not wholly
within the delegated powers of Congress and is not solely within the
constitutional authority of the President.
3. When the agreement itself is to have the force of law without
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legislative action by the Congress, and the action contemplated is not
solely within the President's constitutional authority.
4. When the agreement implies commitments affecting the nation as a
whole.
5. When it is desired to give the utmost formality to the commitment
with a view to requiring similar formality on the part of the other
government concerned in the interest of long continued respect for its
terms.
An executive agreement is used:
1. When the undertaking is made pursuant to or in accordance with
existing legislation or a treaty.
2. When made subject to Congressional approval or implementation.
3. When made under and in accordance with the President's constitutional power.
No further action was taken on S3475.
It fell to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to develop the bill
which finally was enacted into law. Senator Clifford P. Case (R.N.J.)
introduced S596 on February 4, 1971. Hearings were held during the first
session. The bill required the Executive Branch to submit the texts of all
international agreements to Congress within 60 days after execution. The
Committee reported the bill at the beginning of the second session. On
February 16, the Senate approved it by a vote of 81-0. Earlier, the
Department of State opposed the measure, but when the Senate voted
unanimously for it, decided not to oppose it further. The House passed the
measure by a voice vote on August 14 and it was signed into law eight days
later. P.L. 92-403.
The Moscow Agreements
Among the seven agreements which President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid L. Brezhnev signed in Moscow in May
were the treaty limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles and an
executive agreement limiting for five years the number of offensive weapons to those already under construction or deployed. The treaty limited
ABM systems to two designated areas in each country and the executive
agreement also limited the number of missile submarines to be constructed.
The interim executive agreement was submitted for Congressional approval because a provision in the 1961 law establishing the Arms Control
and Disarmanent Agency required that any agreement to limit U.S. Armed
Forces or armanents be approved by legislation or treaty.
The Senate adopted a resolution of ratification of the treaty on August 2.
(Exh. L.)
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H. J. Res. 1227 proposed to approve the interim agreement on offensive
weapons. In the Senate, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash) offered an
amendment requiring any future permanent treaty on offensive arms control to assure each country of rough numerical equality in inter-continental
strategic forces. The interim agreement gives the Soviet Union a sizeable
numerical edge which was thought to be offset by American technological
superiority. Senator Jackson also added a stipulation that any Soviet action
that threatened United States deterrent capability would be grounds for
repudiating the interim agreement. Upon an understanding with the White
House, the latter stipulation was dropped and there was substituted a
statment that failure to negotiate an offensive arms treaty by 1977 would
be grounds for repudiating the ABM treaty. The House accepted the
Senate amendment and the Congress cleared H.J. Res. 1227 on September
25. P.L. 92-448.
Other Treaties approved by the Senate are as follows:
AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL CONCERNING SHRIMP
Ex. P (92- 2)-Resolution of ratification
agreed to October 3, 1972
Restricted the number of U.S.-flag vessels which may fish in the designated area during a single season to 325 shrimp boats; limited to 160 boats
the number allowed to fish in the area at one time; required U.S. vessels to
register with a United States agency and to carry a permit to fish; provided
that the U.S. give $200,000 to Brazil to aid Brazil in its enforcement
responsibilities; and further provided that the U.S. compensate Brazil in
the amount of $100 for each day a U.S. shrimp vessel is under the control
of Brazilian enforcement authorities due to a violation of this agreement.
AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE CONVENTION
Ex. T (92- 2)- Resolution of ratification
agreed to October 3, 1972
Required the extradition or prosecution of persons who commit acts of
sabotage or otherwise destroy aircraft or who endanger the safe flight of an
aircraft by damaging it or destroying or damaging air navigation facilites.
AMENDMENT TO STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Ex. C (92- 1)-Resolution of ratification
agreed to October 17, 1972
Increased the membership of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 25 to 35 for the purpose of
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 3

722

INTERNATIONAL

LAWYER

achieving more equitable representation on the Board for the countries of
the lesser developed regions as well as to increase the representation of
countries more advanced in the technology of atomic energy.
CONVENTION ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL METROLOGY
Ex. 1 (92- 2)- Resolution of ratification
agreed to August 11, 1972
Established an International Organizations of Legal Metrology to promote international cooperation in the field of legal metrology which deals
with standards for instruments and measurement techniques involved in
the legal determination of quantity and quality.
CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE
AT SEA AMENDMENTS
Ex. 0 (92-1)-Resolution of ratification
agreed to October 3, 1972
Required that specified navigational equipment be carried aboard certain
vessels; specified conditions of operation that must be met by vessels using
automatic pilots; required that all ships subject to the Convention carry
adequate and up-to-date nautical publications; and improved the requirements for firemen's outfits and personal equipment in cargo ships as well as
requirements for lifebuoys, life jackets, radio installations, and shipborne
navigational equipment.
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS
Ex. M (92- 2)-Resolution of ratification
agreed to October 6, 1972
Provided reasonable assurance of the payment of fair and prompt compensation in the event that a space object of a State causes injury or
damage to the citizens of another State.
CONVENTION ON TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL
OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
Ex. A (92- 2)- Resolution of ratification
agreed to June 13, 1972
Made the employment of letters of request a principal means of obtaining evidence abroad; improved the means for securing evidence abroad by
increasing the powers of consuls and by introducing in the civil law world,
on a limited basis, the concept of commissioners; provided means for
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securing evidence in the form needed by the court where the action is
pending; and reserved all more favorable and less restrictive practices
arising from internal law, internal rules of procedure, and bilateral or
multilateral conventions.
CONVENTION ON THE MEANS OF PROHIBITING AND
PREVENTING THE ILLICIT IMPORT, EXPORT, AND
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
Ex. B (92-2)-Resolution of ratification
agreed to August 11, 1972

Prohibited the importation of stolen cultural property in order to combat
the increasing illegal international trade in national art treasures and established a system of export certification for cultural property designated by
each member country as being of importance.
CONVENTION TO PREVENT AND PUNISH ACTS OF TERRORISM
Ex. D (92-1)- Resolution of ratification
agreed to June 12, 1972

Condemned crimes of violence against officials of foreign states and
international organizations as common crimes regardless of the motive for
which they were committed and thus excluded such crimes, for purposes of
extradition and asylum, from being treated as political offenses for which
diplomatic or territorial asylum is often extended.
EXTRADITION TREATY WITH ARGENTINA
Ex. F (92-2)-Resolution of ratification
agreed to June 13, 1972

Listed 30 extraditable offenses, including those relating to narcotics and
aircraft hijacking; permitted extradition in the case of conspiracy to commit
any of the offenses mentioned; provided that if one of the parties refuses to
extradite a national of the other party, then that party is obliged to undertake to try the individual requested when the offense is punishable under its
own laws and it has appropriate jurisdiction; provided for judicial cooperation in criminal matters by the execution of letters rogatory; and contained
other provisions.
INTERNATIONAL PLANT PROTECTION CONVENTION
Ex. D (84-2)- Resolution of ratification
agreed to June 12, 1972

Promoted international cooperation in controlling pests and diseases of
plants and plant products and in preventing their introduction and spread
across international boundaries.
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PARTIAL REVISION OF THE RADIO REGULATIONS
RELATING TO SPACE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Ex. E (92-2)- Resolution of ratification
agreed to June 13, 1972
Revised the Radio Regulations in regard to the use of space telecommunication techniques, radio frequency allocations, technical criteria,
and administrative procedures.
PROTOCOL TO AMEND SINGLE CONVENTION ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS
Ex. J (92-2)- Resolution of ratification
agreedto September 18, 1972
Provided for a three-fold approach to the problem of preventing illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs and the abuse of those drugs: (1) by strengthening
the international control machinery to enable it more effectively to uncover
and curb both the excess and the illicit cultivation of the opium poppy, as
well as the illicit production, manufacture, and trafficking in narcotic drugs;
(2) by expanding the provisions of existing bilateral extradition treaties
with a view to assuring that offenders of narcotic laws will find no haven
from prosecution; and (3) by establishing guidelines for avoiding drug
abuse and for the treatment of individuals.
PROTOCOL TO NORTHWEST ATLANTIC
FISHERIES CONVENTION
Ex. C (92- 1) -Resolution of ratification
agreed to October 3, 1972
Provided a more expeditious method of amending the 1949 International
Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries by allowing amendments
to the convention to enter into force 120 days after the approval of only
three-fourths of the contracting governments unless a contracting government files an objection within 90 days of the date of notification by the
depository government.
SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY
Ex.H (92- 1)-Resolution of ratification
agreed to February 15, 1972
Provided that the parties undertake not to emplant or emplace nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the
ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a "seabed
zone" as defined therein.
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TREATY WITH HONDURAS ON THE SWAN ISLANDS

Ex.H (92-2)- Resolution of ratification
agreed to June 12, 1972

Settled longstanding differences between the United States and Honduras resulting from their conflicting claims to the Swan Islands.
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION AS REVISED AT PARIS
ON JULY 24, 1971, TOGETHER WITH TWO RELATED PROTOCOLS

Ex. G (92- 2)- Resolution of ratification
agreedto August 14, 1972

Made limited compulsory licensing systems available for the benefit of
developing countries with respect to translations and reproductions in
order to satisfy their practical needs for ready access to literary, scientific,
and artistic works, without weakening the structure and scope of copyright
protection presently offered by the developed countries under the two
multilateral conventions on copyright, the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Berne Convention (to which the United States is not a
party).
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